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Abstract
We examine the e¤ect of a threat of entry on experimentation about demand by an incumbent
monopolist when there is a xed cost of entry. We show that experimentation may itself be used
as a tool for entry deterrence and derive conditions under which experimentation reduces the
probability of entry. These conditions depend on the entry rule which in turn depends on entry
costs. We show that if experimentation does not deter entry, the monopolist incumbent experiments
less. We also characterize experimentation and entry in the linear-uniform example, and show that
cost of entry and experimentation do not have a monotonic relationship.
1 Introduction
This paper studies experimentation in a market with potential entry that entails a xed cost.
Experimentation, or active learning, refers to a rm adjusting its choices away from the myopically
optimal levels in order to learn about parameters of interest. In the absence of entry, it has been
shown (see Mirman, Samuelson and Urbano, 1993 (MSU)), that a monopolist has an incentive to
actively learn about demand so that it can make greater prots in the future. We examine the
impact of potential, costly entry on this incentive. In addition, we identify and analyze a new
rationale for experimentation, namely entry-deterrence, since due to xed cost of entry, entry need
not always occur.
The issues addressed in this paper are important because rms face constant pressures of existing
or potential competition, while making decisions under uncertainty. In addition to the standard
decisions such as setting prices or choosing output, a rm also aims to acquire information about
various elements relevant to its prots, such as demand, cost of production and the nature of
competition. However, just as with prices or quantities, the rm must consider strategic e¤ects in
determining the extent of active learning. That is, the rm must take into account the e¤ect of
its experimentation on decisions of other rms in the market or rms considering entry into the
market. On one hand, experimentation may reveal good information to other rms and encourage
further entry thereby reducing future benet to the experimenting rm but on the other hand,
it may reveal bad news discouraging entry. In order to understand pricing in such markets, it is
important to analyze experimentation and entry in the same model. Indeed, since experimentation
itself may lead to a lower price in the market, just as limit pricing, it is important to incorporate
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the e¤ect of experimentation in a market with threat of entry. It is then an empirical issue whether
the observed low prices are a result of limit pricing or experimentation, given other aspects of the
market, such as the demand structure. Further, the learning behavior of the incumbent is also
important for understanding overall welfare e¤ects of entry. For example, if a threat of entry leads
to more information generation, which in turn leads to better economic decisions by agents, welfare
e¤ects of entry are strengthened.
This work has empirical implications for emerging markets that are characterized by increasing
deregulation and therefore, potential entry and at the same time, by uncertainty and asymmetric
information. Similarly, there are empirical implications for markets where experimentation is com-
mon such as the health industry or the movie industry. Firms introduce new products, such as
drugs, or movies, in limited markets to learn about demand or rms may adjust their advertising
expenditure in order to learn about demand. This paper provides insights into the e¤ect of potential
entry on various experimentation variables. In particular, we show that in such markets, the level
of xed costs and therefore, the extent to which entry is a threat, determines the market outcomes
including the extent to which information is generated and used in setting prices and quantities.
Traditionally, the literature on entry-deterrence has focused on limit pricing, nancial structure,
capacity expansion or advertising etc., as a tool for deterring entry. We show that an incumbent
operating under uncertainty can use experimentation as a tool for entry-deterrence for some para-
meter values. While the literature on entry-deterrence (see the pioneering works of Milgrom and
Roberts, 1981, and Matthews and Mirman, 1983) as well as experimentation is extensive, the role
of experimentation as an entry-deterrence tool has not been analyzed. The existing literature has
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examined experimentation in di¤erent contexts, such as a duopoly market structure (see Mirman,
Samuelson and Schlee, 1994, Alepuz and Urbano, 1999 and Belleamme and Bloch, 2001) or learn-
ing by a principal in the context of entry-deterrence (Jain, Jeitschko and Mirman (2002, 2003 and
2005))1 or information acquisition by an incumbent facing entry when there are no entry costs
(Dimitrova and Schlee2 (DS), 2003 and Patron, 2001)). This paper generalizes the work of DS by
incorporating entry costs and thereby permitting the analysis of the e¤ects of experimentation on
entry-deterrence. With no entry costs, entry cannot be deterred and therefore, the new role of
experiementation cannot be studied.
We also provide insights into how entry a¤ects the incumbents incentive to experiment when
there are entry costs. In this respect, we generalize results of DS. They show that entry reduces
information acquisition, under the conditions of linear demand, increasing demand dispersion and
no entry costs. Since most models of entry assume xed costs of entry, reecting the conclusions
of empirical research, it seems important to study experimentation and entry when the entrant
faces xed entry costs, as we do in this paper. DS provide an example with entry costs where
entry increases information acquisition. Our contribution is to derive conditions under which the
incumbent experiments less even when there are entry costs. Further, our results are robust to the
direction of demand dispersion, and are consistent with the DS example of information increasing
entry. We do not address the other useful examples in DS where entry increases information
acquisition since our focus is on conditions under which entry reduces information acquisition.
The reason to expect that an incumbent threatened with entry may experiment to a di¤erent
1These authors do not emphasize the role of experimentation as an entry-deterrence tool. Their focus is on the
role of debt in deterring entry.
2They provide an interesting example with entry costs.
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extent is that entry reduces future prots of the incumbent and thus, reduces the marginal benet
from experimentation. If this were the only e¤ect, the monopolist facing entry will reduce experi-
mentation since the marginal benet is smaller and the marginal cost of experimentation, incurred
in the rst period in the form of lower prots than in the static case, remains the same.3 However,
when entry does not occur surely, experimentation also inuences the potential entrants decision to
enter the market, and may deter entry. The intuition behind this is that experimentation increases
the probability of a high price being associated with high demand and a low price being associ-
ated with low demand. Since entry is only protable when demand is high, experimentation can
lower the probability of entry. This is not guaranteed and only occurs for some parameter values
because better information can either reinforce beliefs that market is good or that the market is
bad. For example, if entry only occurs when demand is good, then experimentation, by increasing
this probability, increases the probability of entry. This scenario depends on the cost of entry and
other parameters of the model.
We show that if experimentation does not deter entry, the threatened incumbent experiments
less. The precise conditions that lead to a higher probability of entry and less experimentation
depend on the entry rule, which in turn depends on the size of the xed cost. We also show that these
conditions become weaker as xed cost increases. That is, as xed cost increases, experimentation
increases probability of entry and thus, the incumbent experiments less due to entry for a larger
set of parameters. If entry is deterred, which occurs when entry cost is su¢ciently low, results are
3We use the term myopic in the sense standard in the experimentation literature - that the incumbent ignores
the e¤ect of its current actions on the future outcomes altogether. The implication is that the myopic incumbent
chooses the same quantity with or without the threat of entry. Then, greater experimentation by the incumbent can
be simply measured by the di¤erence between the output choice of the isolated incumbent and that of the threatened
incumbent.
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unclear in a general setting because there is a trade-o¤ between the reduced marginal benet from
experimentation (given entry) and the increased benet of experimentation as an entry-deterrence
tool. We work out an example in which this trade-o¤ becomes clear. In the example, the price shock
is uniformly distributed and the demand function is linear, satisfying the assumption of increasing
dispersion. Results cover the entire range of possibilities, depending on entry costs. That is,
probability of entry may increase or decrease and experimentation by the threatened incumbent
may or may not be less than that of the isolated incumbent. Further, we nd that the e¤ect of xed
cost of entry on experimentation is non-monotonic. As entry cost increases from low to moderate,
the incumbent experiments more but as entry cost increases from moderate to high, the incumbent
experiments less. The intuition behind this is that when entry cost is moderate, so that entry does
not occur surely, entry-deterrence becomes possible. The implication for welfare e¤ects of entry is
that at moderate levels of entry cost, the competitive e¤ects of entry are strengthened whereas for
high levels, the informational e¤ect o¤sets the competitive e¤ects.
We assume the standard environment (as in MSU) to study this problem. Demand is uncertain.
It can be high or low, and in each case, there is a random shock, independent of the state of
demand, that determines the price of the good. Firms only know the probabilities of demand being
high or low and of the random shock. Price of the good at the end of the rst period is assumed
to be observable and used to update beliefs about the state of demand by all market participants.
In this paper, it is assumed that output of the incumbent is also observable so that the posterior
beliefs are identical across market participants.4 The incumbent is the only rm in the market
4This assumption is standard in the experimentation literature. While this assumption does not apply to all
economic situations, the resulting analysis is useful in understanding certain economic situations, for example, when
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in the rst period and therefore is the only rm that can experiment. We assume that all costs
other than entry costs are zero, for convenience. We also assume a demand structure in which a
higher output provides more information about true demand, that is, demand structure satises
increasing demand dispersion, though results can be shown to hold even when the opposite holds.
We then consider di¤erent entry rules, corresponding to di¤erent levels of xed cost.
The paper is organized as follows: in section 2, the model is presented, with both the benchmark
no-entry case and the entry case; in section 3, we present an example with linear demand and
uniformly distributed demand shock; in section 4, the e¤ect of potential entry is analyzed in general;
nally, in section 5, we conclude. The Appendix contains some derivations and proofs.
2 Model
There are two time periods, t = 1; 2: In each period, output is chosen by rms in the market,
given the inverse demand function, to maximize their expected prot over the two periods. We
assume no discounting for simplicity. Let p = g(q; )+ denote the inverse demand function, where
p is the market price of the good, publicly observed at the end of the rst period; q is the rst
period output; g(:; ) is a twice-continuously di¤erentiable function, decreasing in q; and  is a
time-invariant demand parameter in f; g: The upper bar indicates high demand and the lower
bar indicates low demand. We shall use g and g to denote the expected price under high demand
and low demand states respectively. The state of demand is unknown to the rms. Instead, rms
the choice variable is advertising expenditure, or research and development expenditure, rather than output. In some
situations, even output may be observed simply because the rm may be required to report it. Further, the analysis
and results of the observable case provide guidance for the analysis of the situation where the output is not observed
and hence, signal jamming occurs.
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have a prior belief that with probability 0 demand is high and with probability 1  0; demand is
low. The random component of the market price  is distributed according to the density function
f():We assume that the density function f satises the monotone likelihood ratio property strictly
(f
0()
f() is a continuous and strictly decreasing function), is continuously di¤erentiable on the entire
real line and has zero mean. The random component is assumed to be uncorrelated over the two
time periods.
At the end of the rst period, the market price is realized and observed by all market partic-
ipants. In this paper, it is also assumed that output q is observed by all participants. These two
observations are used to update beliefs about the state of the demand, according to Bayes rule.
Denoting the posterior belief that demand is high by ; we obtain:
(p; q) =
0f(p  g(q; ))
0f(p  g(q; )) + (1  0)f(p  g(q; ))
(1)

0f
0f + (1  0)f
:
It should be noted that MLRP is equivalent to  being non-decreasing in p: It is also equivalent to
f=f decreasing in p:
After updating beliefs, all rms in the market choose the second period output, given the
expected inverse demand function, to maximize the second period expected prots. Expected
prots of the incumbent in the rst period are given by (q) = q(0g(q; ) + ((1  0)g(q; )): For
simplicity, we assume that costs are zero for the incumbent. The entrant incurs a xed cost of
entry, F:
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2.1 The benchmark: No-Entry
This is the standard experimentation model (see MSU). The second period expected prots of the
incumbent are the same as in the rst period except for possibly di¤erent beliefs, denoted by : Let
VM ((p; q)) denote the interim value function of the incumbent under the no-entry scenario, that
is, the maximized expected second period prots, given : Let h(p; q) denote the probability that
p is realized at the end of the rst period given the choice of q: That is, h(p; q) = 0f + (1  0)f:
Finally, let WM (q) denote the value function, that is the interim value function integrated over
the rst period price; namely,
R
VM ((p; q))h(p; q)dp: The rst period maximization problem of the
monopolist, then, is to choose the rst period output q to maximize the sum of expected prots in
each period:
(q) = (q) +WM (q):
A myopic incumbent ignores the future and thus, chooses the rst period output to maximize
(q). Experimentation is measured by the di¤erence between the rst period output chosen by a
myopic incumbent and that of an experimenting incumbent who takes the e¤ect of its rst period
choice on the future beliefs. We impose Assumption 1 of MSU to ensure that quantity-increasing
experimentation occurs when the incumbent does not face the threat of entry. For convenience,
this assumption is stated below and illustrated in Figure 1. Let bq be the highest quantity chosen
by the incumbent who does not face the threat of entry, to be referred to as an isolated incumbent.
Assumption 1 (MSU): For all q 2 [0; bq]; g < g and g0 < g0 < 0:
That is, the high demand curve lies above and is atter than the low demand curve. In other
words, mean demand curves become further apart as q increases so that a higher q leads to better
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information in the second period. Furthermore, information is valuable because di¤erent outputs
are optimal corresponding to the states of high and low demand under Assumption 1. MSU show
that under this assumption, the monopolist chooses a higher q than in the myopic case because
the marginal benet of doing so is positive at the myopic output level. This in turn is based on
two conditions: one that the interim value function is convex in ; implying that information is
valuable (see Blackwell, 1951) and second that the incumbents actions can inuence information
because demand curves become further apart with a higher q. MSU provide examples of linear
demand functions where either information is not valuable or the monopolist is unable to learn.
We rule out those cases so that experimentation occurs in the absence of the threat of entry. Note
that experimentation is costly in the current period. That is, due to the choice of an output that
is di¤erent from the static optimal level, the monopolist sacrices current prots in exchange for
higher prots in the future on account of better information. It is this trade-o¤ that drives the
decision to experiment.
2.2 Potential Entry
Expected prot of the entrant upon entry is e(qe; qi) = qe(g(qe + qi; ) + ((1   )g(qe + qi; ));
where qe is the entrants output and qi is the incumbents output in the second period. The entrant
enters if and only if e(q

e(); q

i ()) = e()  F; where q

e and q

i are the Cournot-Nash equilibrium
outputs under incomplete information. We assume that the demand function satises conditions
to generate a unique equilibrium in which the entrants prots are increasing in 5 and therefore,
the entry condition reduces to   e; where e is a constant determined from the values of F; 
5The Appendix contains the precise conditions required. These conditions are satised when demand is linear.
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and :
Let (qe; qi) = qi(g(qe + qi; ) + ((1   )g(qe + qi; )) denote the incumbents second period
prots if   e: Let VD() = (q

e(); q

i ()) denote the incumbents interim value function under
Cournot duopoly. Specically, the interim value function of the incumbent, denoted by Vi(); is
given by:
Vi() = VM ();  < e;
Vi() = VD();   e:
Obviously, VM () > VD()8  e and therefore, the interim value function is discontinuous at e:
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Substituting e in (1) for  yields a cut-o¤ value for the observed market price p; as a function
of q: Then, by MLRP, the entry rule enter if and only if   e is equivalent to enter if and only
if p  bp(q) where bp(q) is the price that corresponds to the cut-o¤ belief e; given q: That is, the
entrant enters for all prices above bp(q) and stays out otherwise. This implies that the expected
value function of the threatened incumbent takes the following form:
Wi(q) =
Z
bp(q)
 1
VM ((p; q))h(p; q)dp+
Z
1
bp(q)
VD((p; q))h(p; q)dp:
The problem of the myopic incumbent remains the same and thus, the threatened incumbent is
said to experiment more if and only if it chooses a higher output than the isolated incumbent. Since
6Note that this discontinuity implies that we can not use convexity of the value function to demonstrate that the
threatened incumbent learns or the convexity of the di¤erence VM   Vi to show that the isolated monopolist learns
more, as DS do, since VM  Vi is discontinuous at the belief when entry occurs. However, we can and do use convexity
of VM   VD in our main result.
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the two types of incumbent face the same cost in the rst period, it su¢ces to consider the e¤ect
of the rst period choice on the value function. In particular, the isolated incumbent experiments
more if and only if the marginal future benet from the rst period output is larger without the
threat of entry.
3 An Example
In this section, we examine the case where the inverse demand is linear and the random term in the
inverse demand function is uniformly distributed. We derive closed-form solutions in this example
and therefore, characterize the relationship between experimentation and entry-deterrence. We
nd that depending on the xed cost of entry and therefore the entry rule, probability of entry
may increase or decrease with experimentation. The uniform distribution leads to either complete
learning or no learning. Due to this extreme learning outcome, the e¤ects of experimentation on
entry become transparent.
Let the inverse demand function be given by p = a   bq + , where a and b are unknown,
strictly positive, parameters and  is a random, unobservable term that is known to be distributed
uniformly on the interval [ ; ], where  > 0. The intercept a and slope b take two di¤erent
values: (a; a) and (b; b); where a  a and b < b; so that demand displays increasing dispersion as q
increases. Let p and p be the mean prices under high demand and low demand respectively. The
prior belief that demand is high (the upper bars) is 0: Let ba() and bb() denote the mean values
of the intercept and slope respectively, at the posterior belief .
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Bayes rule generates the following posterior distribution:
 =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
1; prob = 0
p p
2 ;
0; prob = (1  0)
p p
2
0; prob =
2 (p p)
2
9>>>>>>=>>>>>>;
The interim value function of the isolated monopolist is VM () = (ba())2 =4bb() and that of a
monopolist who faces sure entry is VD() = (ba())2 =9bb(): However, since  takes only three values,
probabilities of which are easily calculated, we obtain the following value function of the isolated
monopolist:
EVM =
a2
4b
(1  0)

a  a  (b  b)q
2

+
a2
4b
0

a  a  (b  b)q
2

+
+
 ba(0)2
4bb(0)
! 
2  
 
a  a  (b  b)q

2
!
:
For the incumbent facing entry, the value function depends on the entry rule, which in turn
depends on the size of the xed cost of entry. Since expected prots of the entrant are increasing
in ,7 as F increases, entry occurs for a smaller set of beliefs. Setting e() = F yields the level of
posterior belief, in terms of F; such that the entrant breaks even. Precise conditions for the three
entry rules can now be presented:
7To see this, note that expected prots of the entrant are e() = ba()
2=9bb(): Using 4a for a   a and 4b for
b  b; we obtain,
de()
d
=
bb(2ba)(4a)  ba24b
9bb2
:
This expression is positive if and only if 4b4a+2ba+ab  0: All terms in this expression are positive. Thus, e()
is increasing in :
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1. If e(0) < F and e(1) =
a2
9b
 F; entry occurs if and only if  = 1;
2. If a
2
9b < F and e(0)  F; entry occurs if and only if  2 f0; 1g;
3. If e(0) =
a2
9b  F; entry occurs for all beliefs:
We consider these cases next.
3.1 Entry when  = 1 : High Entry Cost
If entry occurs only when demand is revealed to be high, then, the value function of the threatened
incumbent equals:
EVi =
(a)2
4b
(1  0)
a  a  (b  b)q
2
+
(a)2
9b
0
a  a  (b  b)q
2
+
+
 ba(0)2
4bb(0)
!
2  
 
a  a  (b  b)q

2
:
Thus, the only change is in the second term. Due to possible entry, the incumbents prots are
reduced in the high-demand state. Note that in this case, the probability of entry is 0

a a (b b)q
2

;
which increases as q increases.
To see how entry a¤ects experimentation, we calculate the impact of the rst period output
on value functions in the two cases (dropping the argument of the mean intercept and slope for
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convenience):
dEVM
dq
=
 (b  b)
2

(a)2
4b
(1  0) +
(a)2
4b
0  
(ba)2
4bb

;
dEVi
dq
=
 (b  b)
2

(a)2
4b
(1  0) +
(a)2
9b
0  
(ba)2
4bb

:
The isolated incumbent experiments more if and only if dEVM
dq
  dEVi
dq
 0; that is,
 (b  b)
2

5(a)2
36b
0

 0:
This inequality holds because  (b  b) > 0:
Thus, the threatened incumbent experiments less than the isolated incumbent. The intuition
is that experimentation increases the probability of entry and thus, the standard experimentation
e¤ect is reinforced by the entry-deterrence e¤ect. Further, note that the threatened incumbent
experiments if and only if dEVi
dq
 0 which can be shown to hold only for some parameter values.
For all other values, the incumbent reduces information and therefore, reduces the probability of
entry compared to the myopic case.
Next, we consider the case where entry occurs when demand is revealed to be high or not
revealed at all.
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3.2 Entry when  = 1 or 0 : Moderate Entry Cost
The value function of the incumbent changes to:
EVi =
(a)2
4b
(1  0)

a  a  (b  b)q
2

+
(a)2
9b
0

a  a  (b  b)q
2

+
+

(ba)2
9bb
 
2  
 
a  a  (b  b)q

2
!
;
and,
dEVi
dq
=
 (b  b)
2

(a)2
4b
(1  0) +
(a)2
9b
0  
(ba)2
9bb

:
The isolated incumbent learns more if and only if dEVM
dq
  dEVi
dq
 0: This can be simplied to
obtain,
0 
ba2bb ba2 :
Since ba and bb are functions of the prior, we substitute for ba and bb and obtain the following quadratic
inequality in 0 :
20(a
2
 
b  b

  b (a  a)2) + 0
 
a2b  2 (a  a) ab

  ba2  0:
It is straightforward to show that this inequality holds for 0 su¢ciently high provided a=b < a=2b;
that is, if and only if, low demand is su¢ciently lower than high demand. If this is the case, the
isolated incumbent learns more for su¢ciently high values of 0: Otherwise, the inequality does not
hold except weakly at 0 = 1; implying that entry increases experimentation.
Note that probability of entry in this case is 1   (1   0)

a a (b b)q
2

; which is decreasing
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in q. Thus, the interpretation of the result above is that when high demand and low demand
are not too di¤erent, the entry-deterrence role of experimentation dominates the reduced benet
from experimentation and hence, the threatened incumbent experiments more. Thus, when the
noise is uniformly distributed and demand is linear, there are conditions under which a threatened
incumbent experiments more.
Further, in this case, dEVi
dq
 0 implying that the threatened incumbent experiments for all
parameter values and therefore, the probability of entry is less with experimentation.
3.3 Sure Entry: Low Entry Cost
In this case, the prots of the incumbent are lower in all states and thus, the marginal future benet
from experimentation changes to:
dEVi
dq
=
 (b  b)
2

(a)2
9b
(1  0) +
(a)2
9b
0  
(ba)2
9bb

:
The isolated incumbent experiments more if and only if dEVM
dq
  dEVi
dq
 0 or,
 (b  b)
2
5
36

(a)2
b
(1  0) +
(a)2
b
0  
(ba)2bb

 0;
which holds by strict convexity of the value function. Thus, the isolated incumbent experiments
more. This is intuitive since entry cannot be deterred so that entry reduces benets from experi-
mentation unambiguously. Further, in this case, dEVi
dq
 0 implying that the threatened incumbent
experiments for all parameter values
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Let qd and q

m denote the optimal rst period output of the threatened incumbent and the
isolated incumbent respectively. Let q0 be the optimal output chosen by a myopic incumbent. We
can summarize the results for the Example in the following Proposition:
Proposition 1 When demand is linear, satises increasing dispersion and the random component
of price is uniformly distributed, then,
1. If entry occurs if and only if  = 1; (i) the probability of entry increases with experimentation;
(ii) qm > q

d and (iii) q

d > q

0 for some parameter values.
2. If entry occurs for sure, qm > q

d > q

0:
3. If entry occurs if and only if  2 f1; 0g; (i) the probability of entry decreases in q. (ii) q

m > q

d
if and only if a=b < a=2b and 0 
ba2=bb  b=a2 and (iii) qd > q0:
Summarizing, if xed cost is high so that protable entry requires demand to be high for sure,
probability of entry increases with experimentation and the threatened incumbent experiments less
than the isolated incumbent. Indeed, for some parameter values, the threatened incumbent reduces
information in order to deter entry. In contrast, when xed cost is at a moderate level, probability
of entry decreases with experimentation and the threatened incumbent may, for some parameter
values, experiment more than the isolated incumbent. The incumbent never reduces information
in this case. Finally, when xed cost is low so that entry occurs for all possible beliefs, there is
no entry-deterrence e¤ect. Consequently, the threatened incumbent experiments but less than the
isolated incumbent. Note that the relationship between xed cost of entry and experimentation is
non-monotonic. The precise relationship is presented in the following Corollary:
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Corollary 1 qd increases as F increases from low to moderate and decreases as F increases from
moderate to high.
The proof is straightforward and therefore, omitted.
The intuition for this result is that as F increases from low to moderate, the entry-deterrence
role comes into play to o¤set the standard experimentation e¤ect. As a result, experimentation
increases. On the other hand, as F increases further so that protable entry requires high demand,
the entry-deterrence role of experimentation reverses. As a result, experimentation decreases.
Figure 2 illustrates Proposition 1 and Corollary 1.
The linear-uniform case provides insights into the factors that determine whether the threatened
incumbent experiments more or less. In the next section, we exploit these insights in a model where
the assumptions of linearity of demand and uniform distribution of the demand shock are relaxed.
4 General Analysis
In the general model, learning is never complete and given our assumptions on f and g, the posterior
belief  is a di¤erentiable function of p and q; unlike the linear-uniform case. Now, if F is higher
than the expected prots under high demand, the threat of entry is vacuous. On the other hand,
if F is less than expected prots under low demand then entry occurs for all beliefs. In this case,
there is no entry-deterrence possible and the standard experimentation e¤ect prevails, leading the
incumbent to experiment less (as shown by DS, and as seen above in the linear-uniform case). So,
it remains to consider values of F that generate entry for some beliefs but not all.
Let m denote the posterior resulting from the observation of price pm; the unique modal price
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under high demand (it equals the mean price p; if the distribution is symmetric). MLRP holding
strictly implies that f=f decreases as p increases, implying that there can be only one price at which
f=f = 1: Existence of such a price is implied by the assumptions of infnite support and zero (nite)
mean. This is because f cannot be monotonic and must have a global maximum. We dene 
m
and p
m
similarly. By Assumption 1, the density function f lies to the right of the density function
f since g   g > 0 ) p
m
< pm: We start with moderate values of F; values that yield the cut-o¤
belief for entry to be between 
m
and m, and then consider the extreme cases where 1 > e > m
or 0 < e < m.
4.1 Moderate Fixed Cost: e 2 [m; m]
We rst show that the cut-o¤ observed price, above which the entrant enters, is a decreasing
function of the rst period output.
Lemma 1 : For e 2 [m; m];
dbp(q)
dq
 0:
Proof. Substituting e in (1) for  yields (arguments are suppressed for convenience),
e =
0f
0f + (1  0)f
;
f = f;  
e(1  0)
0(1  e)
: (2)
Di¤erentiating implicitly with respect to q yields,
dbp
dq
=
ff 0g0   ff
0
g0
ff 0   ff
0
: (3)
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By MLRP, the denominator is negative. To show that the numerator is positive, note that by
Assumption 1, both g0 and g0 are negative. Further, f 0 < 0 and f
0
> 0; at bp(q); in the range of
beliefs considered, since p
m
and pm are modal prices for the two densities.
Increase in q is equivalent to mean demand curves being further apart, by Assumption 1. Thus,
the set of prices for which the potential entrant enters increases as expected prices are set further
apart. However, this does not necessarily imply that the probability of entry increases as we show
below in the next lemma.
Lemma 2 For e 2 [m; m]; experimentation reduces the probability of entry if and only if the
following condition is satised:
0 
f2f
0
f2f
0
  f
2
f 0
: (4)
Proof. Probability of entry = Prfp  bp(q)g = R1
bp(q) h(p; q)dp: Now,
d
dq
Z
1
bp(q)
h(p; q)dp  0,
0fg
0 + (1  0)fg
0 
 
0f + (1  0)f
 dbp
dq
: (5)
Substituting for dbp
dq
from (3), we obtain,
0(fg
0   fg0) + fg0  (0(f   f) + f)
ff 0g0   ff
0
g0
ff 0   ff
0
:
20
Since ff 0   ff
0
< 0 by MLRP, we obtain the following condition after some simplifying,
0(g
0   g0)

f
2
f 0   f2f
0

  f2f
0  
g0   g0

:
Now, by assumption, g0   g0 > 0 and we can show that f
2
f 0   f2f
0
< 0 by MLRP8. The result
follows.
There are two e¤ects on the probability of entry of an increase in q: On one hand, holding the
cut-o¤ price constant, a higher q implies that lower prices are more likely, which in turn implies
that demand is more likely to be low, and therefore, the probability of entry decreases. On the
other hand, the potential entrant rationally revises the cut-o¤ price downward, after observing a
higher output, and this increases the probability of entry. Lemma 2 shows that if 0 is not too
high, the negative e¤ect on entry dominates. The logic of the proof is that the increase in q shifts
both distributions to the left but the low-demand distribution shifts more than the high-demand
distribution. The result is that the two distributions intersect at a lower price (and by MLRP, a
lower density) implying an increase in the probability of entry if demand turns out to be high and a
decrease in the probability of entry if demand turns out to be low. The lower the prior that demand
is high, the lower the weight on the increase. The intuition behind this is simple: entry occurs if and
only if the entrant believes that demand is su¢ciently likely to be high. Experimentation increases
the probability that higher prices are a result of high demand and lower prices the result of low
demand. The former increases the probability of entry and the latter decreases it. The greater the
8f
2
f 0   f2f
0
< 0, f
2
f 0 < f2f
0
,
f
2
f2
f 0 < f
0
: This is true because MLRP implies that f
f
f 0 < f
0
: Since the RHS
is positive and the LHS is negative, multiplying the LHS by  > 0 preserves the inequality.
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prior belief that demand is high, the greater the weight on the former possibility and hence, the
probability of entry increases for su¢ciently high values of the prior belief.9
Next, we examine the marginal benet from experimentation by comparing the e¤ect of a change
in q on the value function.
dWi(q)
dq
=
d
dq
"Z
bp(q)
 1
VM ((p; q))h(p; q)dp+
Z
1
bp(q)
VD((p; q))h(p; q)dp
#
=
Z
bp(q)
 1
d
dq
[VM ((p; q))h(p; q)] dp+
Z
1
bp(q)
d
dq
[VD((p; q))h(p; q)] dp
+ [VM (0)  VD(0)]h(bp(q); q)dbpdq : (6)
Similarly,
dWM (q)
dq
=
Z
1
 1
d
dq
[VM ((p; q))h(p; q)] dp: (7)
To compare the two derivatives, given by Equations (6) and (7), we x q at the level chosen
when the incumbent is myopic, say q0; and let bp(q0) = p0: Then, subtracting (6) from (7) yields,
d (WM ())
dq
 
d (Wi())
dq
cq0
=
Z
1
p0
d
dq
[VM ((p; q))h(p; q)] dp 
Z
1
p0
d
dq
[VD((p; q))h(p; q)] dp
  [VM (0)  VD(0)]h(p0; q)
dbp
dq
cq0 : ( 8)
9Note that this is an insight not obtained in the Example. There, learning is either complete or zero and conse-
quently, probability of entry is either una¤ected, decreases unambiguously or increases unambiguously, regardless of
the value of the prior. Nevertheless, the Example does show that probability of entry may either increase or decrease
with experimentation, depending on F:
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Using the derivation in the Appendix, Equation (8) becomes,
d (WM ())
dq
 
d (Wi())
dq
cq0
= (g0   g0)(1  0)
 
V 0M   V
0
D

0f(p0)
+
 
g0   g0

(1  0)
Z
1
p0
(V
00
M   V
00
D)
d
dp
fdp
+(VM (0)  VD(0)) (0fg
0 + (1  0)fg
0) (9)
  [VM (0)  VD(0)]h(p0; q)
dbp
dq
cq0 :
Now, we can prove the main result of this paper.
Proposition 2 The isolated incumbent learns more, by choosing a higher q; than the threatened
incumbent if VM   VD is an increasing and convex function of ; and the prior satises:
0 
f2f
0
f2f
0
  f
2
f 0
: (10)
Proof. The isolated incumbent learns more if and only if d(EVM ())
dq
  d(EVi())
dq
cq0  0) R:H:S:
of (9)  0: Now, by assumption of increasing demand dispersion, that is, g0   g0 > 0 and by
assumptions on VM   VD, the rst and the second terms in the RHS of (9) are positive. The third
term is negative because g0 and g0 are both negative. And the fourth term is positive by Lemma
1 and by the fact that VM   VD  0. The Proposition follows if the sum of the last two terms is
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positive. That is,
(VM (0)  VD(0)) (0fg
0 + (1  0)fg
0   h(p0; q)
dbp
dq
cq0)  0;
0fg
0 + (1  0)fg
0   h(p0; q)
dbp
dq
cq0  0:
This inequality is the opposite of (5) and therefore, the result follows.
Condition (4) is necessary and su¢cient for a decrease in probability of entry. Thus, condition
(10) in Proposition 1 implies that if the probability of entry is increasing in q; which occurs if the
prior on high demand is high enough, and if conditions on value functions are satised, then the
isolated incumbent will experiment more than the threatened incumbent.10
This proof provides insight into the trade-o¤ that a threatened incumbent faces when choosing
output in the rst period. The rst two terms in (9) represent the reduced expected marginal
benet from experimentation given a certain probability of entry and the last two terms represent
the expected gain/loss due to a change in the probability of entry induced by experimentation.
Since entry reduces the expected marginal benet from experimentation, the rst two terms are
positive (meaning that the isolated incumbent enjoys a higher expected marginal benet). On the
other hand, the e¤ect of experimentation on entry deterrence is ambiguous. If it increases the
probability of entry, as is the case when (10) is met, the entry-deterrence e¤ect and the standard
experimentation e¤ect reinforce each other, implying that the threat of entry reduces information
acquisition. This corresponds to the scenario of high xed costs in the Example. On the other
10 It can be easily veried that the assumptions on VM  VD are satisifed for linear demand, that is, g(q; ) = a bq;
where  = (a; b): There, VM   VD = 5 (ba())
2 =36bb():
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hand, if (10) is not met, entry may or may not reduce information acquisition, depending on the
demand function and the nature of uncertainty. This corresponds to the case of moderate xed
costs in the Example.
We next show that the su¢cient condition for entry to reduce experimentation by the incumbent
becomes weaker as entry becomes more costly. That is, the incumbent experiments less in the
presence of a threat of entry for a larger set of prior beliefs. This result corresponds to the monotonic
e¤ect of F on experimentation in the Example, as F increases from moderate to high.
Let 0 
f2f
0
f2f
0
 f
2
f 0
; the bound given in Proposition 2, by Inequality (10).
Proposition 3 The bound 0 decreases as F increases.
The proof is in the Appendix.
We next discuss cases where cost of entry is either low or high so that the e¤ect of experimen-
tation on entry is unambiguous, that is regardless of the value of the prior. These cases correspond
to the scenarios of moderate and high xed cost in the Example.
4.2 Extreme Fixed Cost
In this subsection, we discuss the extreme cases. There are two possibilities to consider: one, when
protable entry requires that the cut-o¤ belief for entry satisfy 1 > e > m; due to a high xed
cost and two, when protable entry occurs even when 0 < e < m, due to a low xed cost of
entry. It turns out that experimentation has an unambiguous e¤ect on probability of entry in
these two cases. When xed cost is high, experimentation increases probability of entry regardless
of the prior. To understand the intuition, note that in this range of prices, both f and f slope
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downwards. As a result, as experimentation spreads the distributions apart and to the left, the
cut-o¤ price has a higher likelihood of occurring under high demand but then to maintain the cut-
o¤ likelihood ratio, the cut-o¤ price must also entail a higher likelihood under low demand. Thus,
the probability of entry increases regardless of the state of demand. This has a straightforward
implication for experimentation: the threatened incumbent has less of an incentive to experiment
because both the entry-deterrence e¤ect and the marginal benet e¤ect reinforce each other.
In contrast, in the other extreme case, when e < m; experimentation reduces probability of
entry regardless of the value of prior and therefore, the e¤ect on experimentation of the threat
of entry is ambiguous since the entry-deterrence e¤ect and the standard benet from learning go
in the opposite direction. The intuition behind entry deterrence is that now both f and f slope
upwards, and thus as experimentation spreads the distributions apart and to the left, probability
of entry falls regardless of the state of demand. As a result, we do not have an obvious su¢cient
condition to ensure less experimentation by an incumbent facing entry. Note that this is the case in
which the trade-o¤ between standard marginal benet from experimentation and entry-deterrence
benet is most severe. This would seem to be the case in which entry may increase experimentation.
On the other hand, this is also the case when entry occurs more often and therefore the expected
marginal benet from experimentation (given a probability of entry) is lower. Thus, overall, one
cannot conclude that entry increases experimentation.
The linear-uniform example illustrates these results. When entry cost is high, the probability
of entry is increasing in experimentation and experimentation is less under a threat of entry. When
entry cost is moderate, probability of entry decreases in experimentation but the entry-deterrence
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role of experimentation may or may not be dominated by the reduced benet from experimentation
in the future due to entry.
Thus, the overall conclusion of this section, which assumes increasing demand dispersion, is
that when demand displays increasing dispersion, as the cut-o¤ belief for entry increases, the role
of experimentation in entry-deterrence becomes weaker and therefore, the su¢cient condition for
entry to reduce experimentation becomes weaker. Since the level of xed cost drives the cut-o¤
belief in our model, the implication is that, the higher the xed cost of entry, the more likely it is
that the incumbent facing entry experiments less than the incumbent not facing entry.11
5 Conclusion
This paper provides another rationale for experimentation, namely, that it can be used as a tool for
entry-deterrence, and thus, enriches the literature both on entry-deterrence and experimentation.
We have analyzed the learning behavior of an incumbent who faces a threat of entry with entry
costs. The main question addressed here is whether the threat of entry reduces or increases ex-
perimentation and if so, under what conditions. We have derived su¢cient conditions under which
the incumbent facing a threat of entry experiments less. In doing so, we have also shown that ex-
perimentation need not reduce the probability of entry and identied conditions under which entry
becomes more likely or less likely due to experimentation. Further, the linear-uniform example
provides a complete characterization of the e¤ects of entry on experimentation and vice-versa.
11As mentioned in the Introduction, results continue to hold if demand satises decreasing dispersion.
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Appendix
Conditions underlying Second Period Equilibrium
The entrant maximizes the expected prots, e(qe; qi; F ); by choosing output qe; given the
incumbents output in the second period, qi; and the xed cost of entry F :
e(qe; qi; F ) = qe(g(qe + qi; ) + ((1  )g(qe + qi; ))  F:
The entrant enters if and only if e(q

e ; q

i ) = e(; F )  0; where q

e and q

i are the Cournot-Nash
equilibrium outputs under incomplete information. Since this is a standard symmetric Cournot
duopoly problem, except that the demand function relates expected price to quantity and the
entrant faces an entry cost, a su¢cient condition for a unique, pure-strategy, equilibrium (see
Tirole (1988)) is that 0 > @
2i
@qiqj
> @
2i
@q2i
; that is the e¤ect of the other rms output on rm
i0s expected marginal prot is negative and smaller in absolute value than the e¤ect of its own
output. In our model, this condition reduces to assuming that @
2i
@qiqj
= qibg11 + bg1 < 0 where
bg(qe + qi; ) = g(qe + qi; ) + ((1   )g(qe + qi; ); bg1 denotes @bg@qi and bg11 denotes @2bg@q2i : Now,
@2i
@q2i
= qibg11 + 2bg1 < 0 and smaller than @2i@qiqj because bg1 < 0 by assumption. If demand curve is
concave or not too convex, so that qibg11 + bg1 < 0; a unique pure-strategy Cournot equilibrium
exists. To ensure that the equilibrium is interior, we further assume that the monopoly output is
larger than the output that induces the other rm to produce zero. The equilibrium outputs qe
and qi are functions of  and parameters  and : Note that F does not enter the solutions.
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Suppressing the parameters, e(q

e(); q

i (); F ) is an increasing function of  if and only if
qe

 @g
@qi
q0i + (1  )
@g
@qi
q0i + g()  g()

 0: This condition requires that bg1q0i + bg  0: That
is, the direct and indirect e¤ect of  on expected price is positive. Using the rst order conditions
and exploiting symmetry of the rms, one can show that q0i =
q0i bg1+bg
2q0i bg11+3bg1
 0 so that the su¢cient
condition for expected prots to be an increasing function of  is as follows:
bg    bgbg1
2(qibg11 + bg1)
g   g 
bg g1   g1
2(qibg11 + bg1) :
We impose these conditions on the demand function (linear demand satises these conditions,
for example) and therefore, the entry condition reduces to   e; where e is a constant determined
from the values of F;  and : Further, e is an increasing function of F:
Derivation of Equation (9)
Suppressing arguments where there is no scope for confusion, we rst derive the expression for
the rst term on the right hand side of (8).
Z
1
p0
d
dq
[VM ((p; q))h(p; q)] dp
=
Z
1
p0
V 0M
d
dq
hdp 
Z
1
p0
VM (0f
0
g0 + (1  0)f
0g0)dp
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Integrating the second term by parts yields,
Z
1
p0
d
dq
[VM ((p; q))h(p; q)] dp
=
Z
1
p0
V 0M

d
dq
h+
d
dp
(0fg
0 + (1  0)fg
0)

dp
+VM (0)(0fg
0 + (1  0)fg
0)
This expression can be reduced to (see Mirman, Samuelson and Schlee (1994) for the rst term):
 
 
g0   g0
 Z 1
p0
V 0M
d
dp
(1  0)fdp+
Z
1
p0
V 0Mf
0(1  0)dp

+VM (0)(0fg
0 + (1  0)fg
0) (A1)
Now,
Z
1
p0
V 0Mf
0(1  0)dp
= (1  0)

 V 0M (0)0f(p0) 
Z
1
p0
V
00
M
d
dp
fdp 
Z
1
p0
V 0
0
M
d
dp
fdp

Substituting this in Equation (A1), we obtain,
Z
1
p0
d
dq
[VM ((p; q))h(p; q)] dp
=
 
g0   g0

(1  0)V
0
M (0)0f(p0)
+
 
g0   g0

(1  0)
Z
1
p0
V "M
d
dp
fdp
+VM (0)(0fg
0 + (1  0)fg
0)
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A similar expression can be obtained for
R
1
p0
d
dq
[VD((p; q))h(p; q)] dp:
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. Let  = f2f
0
  f
2
f 0: Then 0 =
f2f
0
 ; and,
d0
dF
=
1
2
h


f2f" + 2ff
0
f 0

  f2f
0

f2f
00
+ 2ff
0
f 0   f
2
f 00   2ff
0
f 0
i
=
ff
2
h
ff

f
0
f 00   f 0f
00

  2f
0
f 0

ff 0   ff
0
i
 0, fff 0
 
f
0
f 0
f 00   f
00
!
  2f
0
f 0

ff 0   ff
0

 0: (A2)
Now, MLRP implies that f
0
f
is decreasing in p: Thus, using the fact that in the assumed range,
f 0 < 0 and f
0
> 0; we obtain,
f 00 
f
02
f
(A3) 
f
0
f 0
f 00   f
00
!
f 0 
 
f
0
f 0
f 00  
f
02
f
!
f 0: (A4)
Inequality (A2) follows if,
f 0
 
f
0
f 0
f 00   f
00
!

2f
0
f 0

ff 0   ff
0

ff
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which holds because of (A4) if,
 
f
0
f 0
f 00  
f
02
f
!
f 0 
2f
0
f 0

ff 0   ff
0

ff
f 00
f 0
 
f
0
f

2

ff 0   ff
0

ff
f 00 
f 0
f

2f 0  
f
f
f
0

= 2
f 02
f
  f 0
f
0
f
:
By Inequality (A3),
f 00 
f 02
f
 2
f 02
f
 2
f 02
f
  f 0
f
0
f
:
Last inequality follows because in the assumed range, f 0 < 0 and f
0
> 0: Hence, the proof.
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Figure 2: Relationship between F and
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